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Web applications security is a complex problem with several aspects. One aspect is access 
control according to specified security policy. Access control is accomplished by security model 
restrictions. This research is dedicated to developing security access control model for web 
applications. This work describes path-based RBAC model, which improves RBAC and allows 
flexible access control using request path (URI). Authors created guidelines to apply model’s 
elements for real-world web applications. Developing web applications with model described 
allows reducing security risks.
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Расширенная ролевая модель безопасности  
для веб-приложений,  
основанная на иерархии путей
Д.Д. Кононов, С.В. Исаев
Институт вычислительного моделирования СО РАН 
Россия, 660036, Красноярск, ул. Академгородок, 50/44
Обеспечение безопасности веб-приложений – комплексная проблема, имеющая несколько 
аспектов. Одним из аспектов является разграничение доступа в соответствии с заданной 
политикой безопасности. Разграничение доступа осуществляется путем применения 
ограничений, накладываемых моделью безопасности. Данная работа посвящена разработке 
модели безопасности для разграничения доступа в веб-приложениях. В работе описана 
основанная на иерархии путей ролевая модель безопасности, которая улучшает базовую 
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модель RBAC и обеспечивает гибкое разграничение доступа на основе пути запроса (URI). 
Разработаны рекомендации по применению модели для веб-приложений. Разработка 
веб-приложений с применением описанной модели позволяет снизить риски, связанные с 
безопасностью.
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Introduction
Today modern Web applications and services are affected by several security issues. Computer 
security is becoming increasingly important and actual. According to Symantec security research 
[1], in spite of security means development there are high security risks for web applications. Web 
applications security is a complex problem with several aspects. One aspect is access control according 
to specified security policy. Access control is accomplished by security model restrictions. Choosing 
and applying appropriate security model is able to reduce risks of successful attacks.
Widely known security models include discretionary, mandatory, and role-based [2, 3]. In our 
work, we research and develop security model based on Role-based access control model (RBAC) 
[4]. Role access control represents access rights control from subjects to objects grouped by some 
characteristics named roles. Original role-based access control model does not take into account web 
applications features [5] particularly hierarchic requests. Also assigning permissions is limited to roles 
only. This work describes path-based RBAC model, which improves RBAC and allows flexible access 
control using request path (URI). 
Security models
Currently, there are several security access control models. Some of them include access control 
accomplished by discretionary matrix, mandatory levels, and role-based.
Discretionary security models are based on access control from subjects to objects by using access 
control lists or access matrix. This family include security model such as Harrison-Ruzzo-Ulman [6], 
typed access matrix [7], Take-Grant [8].
Mandatory access control – access control from subjects to objects based on assigned 
confidentiality label for information contained in the objects and permission entities to access 
information with such level of confidentiality. An example of the mandatory model is Bell-LaPadula 
[2]. Classic Bell-LaPadula model analyzes conditions under which the computer system cannot 
initiate information flows from the objects with a high level of confidentiality to objects with a lower 
level of confidentiality.
Role-based access control is a further development of the discretionary access control policy: 
permissions to system objects are grouped according to certain characteristics, forming role. Roles are 
intended to manage access control rules in a more simple way.
These models do not take into account the specifics of web applications, in particular, the 
hierarchical organization of requests and links. The paper describes the adapted role-based security 
model that eliminates these problems.
Role-based access control
The original role-based access control model [4] defines a set of elements:
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<U, R, P, S, UA(U), PA(R), user(S), roles(S)>, 
where:
U – set of users;
R – set of roles;
P – set of access permissions;
S – set of user sessions;
cannot initiate information flows from the objects with a high level of confidentiality to objects with 
a lower level of confidentiality. 
Role-based access control is a further development of the discretionary access control 
policy: permissions to system objects are grouped according to certain characteristics, forming role. 
Roles are intended to manage access control rules in a more simple way. 
These models do not take into account the specifics of web applications, in particular, the 
hierarchical organization of requests and links. The paper describes the adapted role-based security 
model that eliminates these problems. 
 
Role-based access control 
The original role-based access control model [4] defines a set of elements: 
<U, R, P, S, UA(U), PA(R), user(S), roles(S)>, 
wher : 
U – set of users; 
R – set of roles; 
P – set of access permissions; 
S – set of user sessions; 
RUUA 2: →  – function assigning for each user a variety of roles to which he can be 
authorized; 
PR 2:PA →  – function assigning for each role set of access permissions, while 
RrPp ∈∃∈∀ ,  such that )(rPAp∈ ; 
US →:user  – function defining for each user session, on whose behalf it is authorized; 
RS 2:roles →  – function defining for user a variety of roles for which he is authorized with 
current session; at the same time Ss∈∀  satisfies the condition ))(()( suserUAsroles ⊆ . 
The model 1RBAC  is defined as 0RBAC , at the same time introducing a role hierarchy 
(RH).  
 
Adapting the model for web applications 
To existing 1RBAC  model’s elements "user", "role", "permission", "session" we added new 
elements taking into account web application features: "token", "request". 
Definition 1. Token (Tk) – set of user attributes that allow him to carry out authentication in 
a system. Token is a pair <name, password>, or pair <public key, private key>. 
Definition 2. Request (Rq) – set of information sent by the client to HTTP server. The 
request contains a set of headers, a unique resource identifier (URI), a set of parameters name/value, 
and a request payload (body). 
Request belongs to the session, one session can handle multiple requests. Request and 
permission are tied by many-to-many relationship. On top of requests Rq inclusion relation is 
defined. 
Definition 3. Request A includes a request B ( AB ≤ ), if the path of a unique resource 
identifier (URI) of request A contains the path of the unique identifier of the resource request B 
with the initial position in the line within the same namespace, with )()( pathpath AlenBlen ≤ , where 
)(xlen  – length of the string x. 
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where: 
U – set of users; 
R – set of roles; 
P – set of access permissions;
S – set of use  s ssions; 
RUUA 2: →  – function assigni g f r each user a vari ty of r les to which he can be 
authorized; 
PR 2:PA →  – function assigning for each role set of access permissions, while 
RrPp ∈∃∈∀ ,  such that )(rPAp∈ ; 
US →:user  – function defining for each user session, on wh s  behalf it i  authorized; 
RS 2:roles →  – function defining for user a variety of roles for which he is authorized with 
current session; at the same ti  Ss∈∀  satisfi s the condition ))(()( suserUAsroles ⊆ . 
The model 1RBAC  is defined as 0RBAC , at the same time introducing a role hierarchy 
(RH).  
 
Adapting the model for web applications 
To existing 1RBAC  m del’s elements "user", "role", "permis ion", "session" we added new 
elements taking into ccount web a plication features: "token", "request". 
Definition 1. Tok n (Tk) – set of user attributes that allow him to carry out authentication in 
a syst m. Toke  is a pair < m , p ssword>, or pair <public key, priv te key>. 
Defini ion 2. Request (Rq) – set of information sent by the client to HTTP server. The 
request contain  a s t of headers, a unique resource identifier (URI), a set of pa ameters name/value, 
and a request payloa  (body). 
Request belongs to the session, one session can handle multip  requests. Request and 
permission are tied by many-to-many r lationship. On top of requests Rq inclusion relation is 
defined. 
Definition 3. Request A includes a request B ( AB ≤ ), if the path of a unique resource 
identifier (URI) of request A c ntains the path of the unique identifier of the resource request B 
with the initial position in the line withi  the same na espace, )()( pathpath AlenBlen ≤ , where 




cann t initiate information flows from the objects with a high level of confidentiality to objects with 
a lower level of confidentiality. 
R le-based access control is a further develop ent of the discretionary access control 
policy: permissions to system objects are grouped according to certain characteristics, forming role. 
Roles are intended to manage access control rules in a more simple way. 
These models do not take into account the specifics of web applications, in particular, the 
hierarchi al organization of requests and links. The paper describes the adapted role-based security 
model that eliminates these problems. 
 
Role-based access control 
The original role-based access control model [4] defines a set of elements: 
<U, R, P, S, UA(U), PA(R), user(S), roles(S)>, 
where: 
U – set of users; 
R – set of roles; 
P – set of access permissions; 
S – set of user sessions; 
RUUA 2: →  – function assigning for each user a variety of roles to which he can be 
authorized; 
PR 2:PA →  – function assigning for each role set of access permissions, while 
RrPp ∈∃∈∀ ,  such that )(rPAp∈ ; 
US →:user  – function defining for each user session, on whose behalf it is authorized; 
RS 2:roles →  – function defining for user a variety of roles for which he is authorized with 
current session; at the same time Ss∈∀  satisfies the condition ))(()( suserUAsroles ⊆ . 
The model 1RBAC  is defined as 0RBAC , at the same time introducing a role hierarchy 
(RH).  
 
Adapting the model for web applications 
To existing 1RBAC  model’s elements "user", "role", "permission", "session" we added new 
elements taking into account web application features: "token", "request". 
Defi ition 1. Token (Tk) – set of user attributes that allow him to carry out authentication in 
a system. Token is a pair <name, password>, or pair <public key, private key>. 
Definition 2. Request (Rq) – set of information sent by the client to HTTP server. The 
request contains a set of headers, a unique resource identifier (URI), a set of parameters name/value, 
and a request payload (body). 
Request belongs to the session, one session can handle multiple requests. Request and 
permission are tied by many-to-many relationship. On top of requests Rq inclusion relation is 
defined. 
Definition 3. Request A includes a request B ( AB ≤ ), if the path of a unique resource 
identifier (URI) of request A contains the path of the unique identifier of the resource request B 
with the initial position in the line within the same namespace, with )()( pathpath AlenBlen ≤ , where 
)(xlen  – length of the string x. 
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Figure 1 shows the requests A, B, C, and D, which satisfy the following: A ≤ B, B ≤ C, B ≤ D, 
A ≤ C, A ≤ D.
Inclusion relation has the following properties:
reflexive: • 
Fig. 1. An example of the inclusion relations on top of requests 
 
Figure 1 shows the requests A, B, C, and D, which satisfy the following: BA ≤ , CB ≤ , 
DB ≤ , CA ≤ , DA ≤ . 
Inclusion relation has t e following properties: 
• refl i rqrqRqrq ≤∈∀ : , 
• antisymmetric: qrrqrqqrqrrqRqqrrq ′=→≤′′≤∈′∀ ))(&)((:, , 
• transitive: 313221321 ))(&)((:,, rqrqrqrqrqrqRqrqrqrq ≤→≤≤∈∀ . 
Thus, the inclusion relation on top of requests set Rq defines non-strict partial order. 
Next, we define a function RqA() mapping permissions to multiple requests RqPRqA 2: → . 
Definition 4. Requests hierarchy (RqH) – inclusion relation defined on top of requests Rq. 
For any Pp∈  the following condition is true: if Rqqrrq ∈′, , )( pRqArq∈ , and qrrq ′≤ , then 
)( pRqAqr ∈′ . 
Thus, the definition 4 makes it possible a flexible access control for individual requests, and 
all children requests. 
Figure 2 shows a diagram of adapted security model elements. The model name is path-
based role-based access control security model. 
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Adapting mandatory access model 
In [9] for role-based security model authors describe use of mandatory access control 
designed to protect against threats to information confidentiality. Within defined terminology, we 
describe mandatory role-based access model to web applications. In addition to defined above 
elements, the following elements were added: 
Rq – set of requests; 
),( ≤L  – confidentiality levels lattice; 
LUc →:  – function of user access levels; 
LRqc →:  – function of confidentiality levels for requests; 
},{ writereadA =  – access types; 
antisy etric: • 
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Thus, the definition 4 akes it possible a flexible access control for individual requests, and 
all children requests. 
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based role-based access control security odel. 
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cannot initiate information flows from the objects with a high level of confidentiality to objects with 
a lower level of confidentiality. 
Role-based a cess control is a further developm nt the discr tionary ac ess con rol 
policy: permissions to system objects are grouped according to certain characteristics, forming role. 
Roles are intended to manage access control rul s in a more simple way. 
These models do not take into account the specifics of web applications, in particular, the 
hi archical organization of requests and links. The paper describes th  adapted role-based security 
model that eliminates these problems. 
 
Role-based access control 
The or ginal role-based access control model [4] defines a set of elements: 
<U, R, P, S, UA(U), PA(R), user(S), roles(S)>, 
where: 
U – set of users; 
R – set of rol s; 
P – set of access permi sions; 
S – set of user sessi s; 
RUUA 2: →  – function assigni g for each user a va ety of roles to which he can be 
authorized; 
PR 2:PA →  – function assigning for each role set of acc ss permissions, while 
RrPp ∈∃∈∀ ,  such that )(rPAp∈ ; 
US →:user  – function defining f r each user session, on whos  behalf it is authorized; 
RS 2:ro s →  – function defini g for user a v riety of roles for which he is authorized with 
current session; at the same ti  Ss∈∀  satisfi s the condition ))(()( sus rUAsrol s ⊆ . 
Th  model 1RBAC  is defined s 0RBAC , at the same time introducing a rol  hi r rchy 
(RH).  
 
Adapting th  model for web applic ions 
To existing 1RBAC model’s elements "us r", "rol ", "p rmission", "session" w  added ne  
el ments taking into account web application features: "token", "request". 
Definition 1. Token (Tk) – set of user attributes that allow him to carry out authentication in 
a system. Token is a pair <nam , password>, or pai  <public key, private key>. 
Definition 2. Request (Rq) – set of information sent by the client to HTTP server. The 
request contains a set of headers, a unique resource identifier (URI), a set of parameters name/value, 
and a request payload (body). 
Request belongs to the session, one session can handle multiple requests. Request and 
permission are tied by many-to-many relationship. On top of requests Rq inclusion relation is 
defined. 
Definition 3. Request A includes a request B ( AB ≤ ), if the path of a unique resource 
identifier (URI) of request A contains the path of the unique identifier of the resource request B 
with the initial position in the line within the same namespace, with )()( pathpath AlenBlen ≤ , where 
)(xlen  – length of the string x. 
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Thus, the inclusion relation on top of requests set Rq defines non-strict partial order.
Next, we define a function RqA() mapping permissions to multiple requests 
Fig. 1. An example of the inclusion relations on top of requests 
 
Figure 1 shows the requests A, B, C, and D, which satisfy the following: BA ≤ , CB ≤ , 
DB ≤ , CA ≤ , DA ≤ . 
Inclusion relation has the following properties: 
• reflexive: rqrqRqrq ≤∈∀ : , 
• antisymmetric: qrrqrqqrqrrqRqqrrq ′=→≤′′≤∈′∀ ))(&)((:, , 
• transitive: 313221321 ))(&)((:,, rqrqrqrqrqrqRqrqrqrq ≤→≤≤∈∀ . 
Thus, the inclusion relation on top of r t  t  fi  
Next, we define a function Rq () i  issi RqPRqA 2: → . 
Definition 4. Requests hierarchy (RqH) – inclusion relation defined on top of requests Rq. 
For any Pp∈  the following condition is true: if Rqqrrq ∈′, , )( pRqArq∈ , and qrrq ′≤ , then 
)( pRqAqr ∈′ . 
Thus, the definition 4 makes it possible a flexible access control for individual requests, and 
all children requests. 
Figure 2 shows a diagram of adapted security model elements. The model name is path-
based role-based access control security model. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Elements of path-based RBAC model 
 
Adapting mandatory access model 
In [9] for role-based security model authors describe use of mandatory access control 
designed to protect against threats to information confidentiality. Within defined terminology, we 
describe mandatory role-based access model to web applications. In addition to defined above 
elements, the following elements were added: 
Rq – set of requests; 
),( ≤L  – confidentiality levels lattice; 
LUc →:  – function of user access levels; 
LRqc →:  – function of confidentiality levels for requests; 
},{ writereadA =  – access types; 
.
Definition 4. Requests hierarchy (RqH) – inclusion relation defined on top of requests Rq. For any 
p ∈ P the following condition is true: if rq,rq' ∈ Rq, rq ∈ RqA(p), and rq ≤ rq', then rq' ∈ RqA(p).
Thus, the definition 4 makes it possible a flexible access control for individual requests, and all 
children requests.
Figure 2 sho s   se rit  odel elements. The model name is path-based 
role-based access control security model.
Adapting mandatory access model
In [9] for role-based security model authors describe use of mandatory access control designed 
to protect against threats to information confidentiality. Within defined terminology, we describe 
mandatory role-based access model to web applications. In addition to defined above elements, the 
following elements were added:
Rq – set of requests;
(L, ≤) – confidentiality levels lattice;
c : U → L – function of user access levels;
c : Rq → L – function of confidentiality levels for requests;
Fig. 1. An example of the inclusion relations on top of requests 
 
Figure 1 shows the requests A, B, C, and D, which satisfy the following: BA ≤ , CB ≤ , 
DB ≤ , CA ≤ , DA ≤ . 
Inclusion relation has the following properties: 
• reflexive: rqrqRqrq ≤∈∀ : , 
• antisymmetric: qrrqrqqrqrrqRqqrrq ′=→≤′′≤∈′∀ ))(&)((:, , 
• tra sitive: 313221321 ))(&)((:,, rqrqrqrqrqrqRqrqrqrq ≤→≤≤∈∀ . 
Thus, the inclusion relation on top of requests set Rq defines non-strict partial order. 
Next, we define a function RqA() mapping permissions to multiple requests RqPRqA 2: → . 
Definition 4. Requests hierarchy (RqH) – inclusion relation defined on top of requests Rq. 
For any Pp∈  the following condition is true: if Rqqrrq ∈′, , )( pRqArq∈ , and qrrq ′≤ , then 
)( pRqAqr ∈′ . 
Thus, the definition 4 makes it possible a flexible access control for individual requests, and 
all children requests. 
Figure 2 shows a diagram of adapted security model elements. The model name is path-
based role-based access control security model. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Elements of path-based RBAC model 
 
Adapting mandatory access model 
In [9] for role-based security model authors describe use of mandatory access control 
designed to protect against threats to information confidentiality. Within defined terminology, we 
describe mandatory rol -base  access model to web applications. In addition to defined above 
elements, the following elements were added: 
Rq – set of requests; 
),( ≤L  – confidentiality levels lattice; 
LUc →:  – function of user access levels; 
:   f ti  f fidentiality levels for requests; 
},{ writereadA =  – access types;    t
}|_{}|_{ LxwritexLxreadxR ∈∪∈=  – set of roles; 
}|),{(}|),{( RqrqwriterqRqrqreadrqP ∈∪∈=  – set of permissions. 
Using the definitions 5.20 and 5.22 [10], according to requirements of liberal mandatory 
access control for set of requests Rq we define a hierarchy on top of roles R and restriction functions 
UA(), roles(), and PA(). 
As a part of the mandatory access control, information flow is defined. 
Definition 5. We assume that there is an inform tion flow from r quest Rqrq∈  to request 
Rqqr ∈′  if and only if there are roles Rrr ∈′, , and session Ss∈ , such that )(),( rPAreadrq ∈ , 
)(),( rPAwriteqr ′∈′ , and )(, srolesrr ∈′ . 
Let us formulate a proposition about the impossibility of forbidden information flows from 
the request with a higher confidentiality level to requests with a lower confidentiality level. 
Proposition 1. If a role-based access model complies with liberal mandatory access control 
requirements, then for any requests Rqqrrq ∈′, , such that )()( qrcrqc ′> , it is impossible to initiate 
information flow from rq  to qr ′ . 
The proof is similar to theorem 5.1 [10]. 
Thus, the model described is safe in terms of information flows for requests with different 
confidentiality levels. 
 
Application of models 
Security models described can be used in a wide range of applications. To apply these 
security models the system must meet the following requirements: 
• centralized access control – access control is carried out only in a single module 
without delegating to other units or systems; 
• principle of least privilege – provide the user only minimal set of privileges 
necessary for his work; 
• separation of duties support – tasks processed in the system may require multiple 
users to process one operation; 
• possibility of decomposition the system into separate components, which can be 
accessed using a variety of URIs, which are unique within the system. 
When the above requirements are met, the system may be divided into different parts, each 
of them is uniquely identified by a URI. URI paths are described as access control elements and 
used to define a set of requests Rq. This set includes all client requests and API calls provided by 
the system. Using Rq request hierarchy is created that reflects the interaction and dependence 
between components. 
In order to apply security model it is necessary to create a set of roles R. The role defines a 
set of permissions that a user can perform. Examples of roles: "user", "moderator", "registrar", 
"administrator". 
Next, the system should have defined set of permissions P. Permissions define specific 
action or operation in the system, for example, "create new user", "delete the document," etc. One 
role can have many permissions. One permission can be assigned to many roles. Assigning 
permissions for roles is performed by function PA(). Permissions are non-overlapping and 
consistent. Elements from permissions P map to a subset of requests Rq using function RqA(). One 
permission can have multiple requests. One request can be assigned to many permissions. 
To maintain users a set of users U is created, which have assigned permissions from P using 
mapping function UA(). One user can have multiple roles. One role can be assigned to multiple 
users. To identify a user the model includes a set of tokens Tk. The elements of the set are pairs of 
<username, password>, or <public key, private key>. Each user can have multiple tokens. The 
token belongs to one user. 
Once authenticated, authorized work of users is carried out by sessions. A session is a set of 
authorized user data, including a set of roles to which the user is authorized. Users can create 
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Using the definitions 5.20 and 5.22 [10], according to requirements of liberal mandatory access 
control for set of requests Rq we define a hierarchy on top of roles R and restriction functions UA(), 
roles(), and PA().
As a part of the mandatory access co rol, r fl is defined.
Definition 5. We assume that there is an information flow from reques  rq ∈ Rq to request rq' ∈ Rq 
if and only if there are roles r,r' ∈ R, and session s ∈ S, such that (rq, read) ∈ PA(r), (rq', write) ∈ PA(r'), 
and r,r’ ∈ roles(s).
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Figure 1 shows the requests A, B, C, and D, which satisfy the following: BA ≤ , CB ≤ , 
DB ≤ , CA ≤ , DA ≤ . 
Inclusion relation has the following properties: 
• reflexive: rqrqRqrq ≤∈∀ : , 
• antisymmetric: qrrqrqqrqrrqRqqrrq ′=→≤′′≤∈′∀ ))(&)((:, , 
• transitive: 313221321 ))(&)((:,, rqrqrqrqrqrqRqrqrqrq ≤→≤≤∈∀ . 
Thus, the inclusion relation on top of requests set Rq defines non-strict partial order. 
Next, we define a function RqA() mapping permissions to multiple requests RqPRqA 2: → . 
Definition 4. Requests hierarchy (RqH) – inclusion relation defined on top of requests Rq. 
For any Pp∈  the following condition is true: if Rqqrrq ∈′, , )( pRqArq∈ , and qrrq ′≤ , then 
)( pRqAqr ∈′ . 
Thus, the definition 4 makes it possible a flexible access control for individual requests, and 
all children requests. 
Figure 2 shows  diagram of adapted se urity model elements. The model name is path-
based role-based access control security model. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Elements of path-based RBAC model 
 
Adapting mandatory access model 
In [9] for role-based security model authors describe use of mandatory access control 
designed to protect against threats to information confidentiality. Within defined terminology, we 
describe mandatory role-based access model to web applications. In addition to defined above 
elements, the following elements were added: 
Rq – set of requests; 
),( ≤L  – confidentiality levels lattice; 
LUc →:  – function of user access levels; 
LRqc →:  – function of confidentiality level  f r requests; 
},{ writereadA =  – access types; 
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Let us formulate a proposition about the impossibility of forbidden information flows from the 
request with a higher confidentiality level to requests with a lower confidentiality level.
Proposition 1. If a role-based access model complies with liberal mandatory access control 
requirements, then for any requests rq,rq' ∈ Rq, such that c(rq) > c(rq'), it is impossible to initiate 
information flow from rq to rq'.
The proof is similar to theorem 5.1 [10].
Thus, the model described is safe in terms of information flows for requests with different 
confidentiality levels.
Application of models
Security models described can be used in a wide range of applications. To apply these security 
models the system must meet the following requirements:
•	 centralized access control – access control is carried out only in a single module without 
delegating to other units or systems;
•	 principle of least privilege – provide the user only minimal set of privileges necessary for his 
work;
•	 separation of duties support – tasks processed in the system may require multiple users to 
process one operation;
•	 possibility of decomposition the system into separate components, which can be accessed using 
a variety of URIs, which are unique within the system.
When the above requirements are met, the system may be divided into different parts, each of them 
is uniquely identified by a URI. URI paths are described as access control elements and used to define a 
set of requests Rq. This set includes all client requests and API calls provided by the system. Using Rq 
request hierarchy is created that reflects the interaction and dependence between components.
In order to apply security model it is necessary to create a set of roles R. The role defines a 
set of permissions that a user can perform. Examples of roles: “user”, “moderator”, “registrar”, 
“administrator”.
Next, the system should have defined set of permissions P. Permissions define specific action 
or operation in the system, for example, “create new user”, “delete the document,” etc. One role can 
have many permissions. One permission can be assigned to many roles. Assigning permissions for 
roles is performed by function PA(). Permissions are non-overlapping and consistent. Elements from 
permissions P map to a subset of requests Rq using function RqA(). One permission can have multiple 
requests. One request can be assigned to many permissions.
To maintain users a set of users U is created, which have assigned roles from R using mapping 
function UA(). One user can have multiple roles. One role can be assigned to multiple users. To 
identify a user the model includes a set of tokens Tk. The elements of the set are pairs of <username, 
password>, or <public key, private key>. Each user can have multiple tokens. The token belongs to 
one user.
Once authenticated, authorized work of users is carried out by sessions. A session is a set of 
authorized user data, including a set of roles to which the user is authorized. Users can create multiple 
sessions. A session belongs to one user. Sessions can have additional data related to authorization or 
specific operation.
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As an example, we describe application of extended path-based RBAC for publication system. 
The system allows users to create articles for public reading. Registered users can create and edit their 
articles. Editors have the ability to edit articles created by users. The administrator has access to all 
sections, including user administration. The system has two users, who write articles: Alice and Bob. 
John is an editor, and Martin is a system administrator. In addition, Martin can work as editor. The 
system provides a special role for anonymous users for public reading without editing articles.
Users U: {Anonymous, Alice, Bob, John, Martin}
Roles R: {Viewer, User, Editor, Administrator}
Permissions P: {“view article”, “create article”, “edit own articles”, “edit all articles”, “user 














Roles assignment for users:
 UA(Anonymous) → {Viewer}
 UA(Alice) → {User}
 UA(Bob) → {User}
 UA(John) → {Editor}
 UA(Martin) → {Editor, Administrator}
Permissions assignment for roles:
 PA(Viewer) → {“view article”}
 PA(User) → {“view article”, “create article”, “edit own article”}
 PA(Editor) → {“view article”, “create article”, “edit all articles”}
 PA(Administrator) → {“user management”, “access control”, “system maintenance”}
Requests assignment for permissions:
 RqA(“view article”) → {/articles/list, /articles/view}
 RqA(“create article”) → {/manage/articles/create}
 RqA(“edit own article”) → {/manage/articles/edit}
 RqA(“edit all article”) → {/manage/articles/edit}
 RqA(“user management”) → {/manage/users}
 RqA(“access control”) → {/manage/permissions}
 RqA(“system maintenance”) → {/manage/system}
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As you can see from the example above, the developed models offer flexibility and simplicity for 
access control restriction that can be used in real-world web applications.
Conclusion
The paper describes extended path-based role access control model, which takes into account web 
applications features. New elements were defined: token, request, inclusion relation. The model created 
allows flexible access control for modern web applications.
Also extended path-based mandatory role-based access control model was created with additional 
sets: requests, security levels lattice, access types, roles, and permissions. Impossibility of forbidden 
information flows from higher to lower security levels was proven.
Authors created guidelines to apply model’s elements for real-world web applications. Developing 
web applications according to these guidelines allows reducing security risks. We use the model 
developed to enhance security in our web applications [11].
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